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Campaigning for utilitas: style, grammar and
philosophy in C. Iulius Caesar
Andreas Willi
1 introduction
C. Iulius Caesar is not a name that readily springs to mind in the context of
an inquiry into the relationship between ‘colloquial’ and literary Latin; for
‘Caesar is incomparably the most “correct” of classical authors, if by “cor-
rect” we mean that he observes the “rules” of Latin orthography, grammar
and word-order that would later become standardised by Palaemon and
others’ (Hall 1998: 18). Caesar’s linguistic self-discipline, which famously
restricts the vocabulary of the Bellum Gallicum to less than 1,300 lexemes,
is so thorough that it even affects and excludes forms, words and construc-
tions which can hardly be called ‘colloquial’ if this term is taken as the
opposite of ‘literary’.1 However, if we admit that colloquial Latin can also
be taken to refer to ‘the Latin used conversationally by the upper . . . classes
during the Republic’ (Dickey, this volume p. 66), in other words be
equated roughly with what ancient theoreticians referred to by terms such
as cottidianus sermo (Rhet. Her. 4.14; cf. Ferri and Probert, this volume
pp. 14, 39), then Caesar might even be called the most colloquial of
Latin authors: there is little in his writings which could not also have
been said, without much stylistic effect, in a standard upper-class con-
versation of his time. All the more, though, the inclusion of a chapter
on Caesar in this collection might seem pointless: for whether we call
nothing or everything ‘colloquial’, the lack of substantial diastratic dif-
ferentiation in the primary material provides little scope for illuminating
comments.2
1 Cf. e.g. the avoidance of the third person plural in -ere, shared with Cicero (E. Lo¨fstedt 1911: 36–9;
Leumann 1977: 607–8 with literature), of the genitive plural deum (Pascucci 1973: 490) or of the
genitive of quality with third-declension adjectives (E. Lo¨fstedt 1956: i.155–62); on the selection and
number of lexemes (excluding names and technical terms) see Eden 1962: 94–8, Pascucci 1973: 493–5
and Hall 1998: 17.
2 This statement does not imply that there is no stylistic variation in the Bellum Gallicum and the
Bellum civile (cf. E. Lo¨fstedt 1956: ii.307–8; Eden 1962: 113–15), only that nothing which we do
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Our present focus will therefore be different. Instead of searching for
marked (non-)colloquialisms in Caesar’s writings, we will ask why he adopts
such a smooth style and what this tells us about his (and some of his contem-
poraries’) ideas on the relationship between colloquial and literary Latin. If
we had only the Bellum Gallicum and the Bellum civile, such an endeavour
might yield little but empty speculation. Fortunately, however, we possess,
in a fragmentary state, a primary source that has rarely been fully explored
or, I will suggest, understood. Mainly this is because Caesar the general
and politician tends to eclipse Caesar the man of culture and learning who,
according to Cicero (Brut. 252, 261), was not only one of Rome’s foremost
orators – second to none but Cicero himself (Quint. Inst. 10.1.114) – but
who had also reached this perfection multis litteris et eis quidem reconditis
et exquisitis summoque studio et diligentia ‘through extensive reading even
of inaccessible and little known texts, through extraordinary and most
careful learning’. The neglected source I am referring to is Caesar’s treatise
De analogia, the remains of which consist of less than three dozen short
fragments mainly culled from ancient scholars and grammarians such as
Gellius, Probus, Charisius, Pompeius and Priscian and nowadays accessible
in the collections of Funaioli (1907: 145–57) and Klotz (1927a: 177–85, the
text and numbering adopted here).
2 date and context of caesar’s de analogia
According to Suetonius (Jul. 56.5), Caesar wrote the two books of De
analogia: in transitu Alpium cum ex citeriore Gallia conventibus peractis ad
exercitum rediret ‘while crossing the Alps when he returned from Cisalpine
Gaul to the army after he had held courts of law’. This information,
together with the fact that the treatise was dedicated to Cicero (Gel. 19.8.3)
and should therefore postdate the reconciliation of Caesar and Cicero in
56 bc, points to a composition in the spring of 55 or 54; in the winter
of 54–53 Caesar stayed with the army, and in the spring of 52 the revolt
of Vercingetorix hardly left any time to spare during a hurried journey
(Dahlmann 1935: 259). Moreover, Hendrickson (1906) has made a good
case for the year 54 from reading some of the introductory words, which
are quoted by the proud dedicatee (Cic. Brut. 253 = fr. 1), as a reply to
Cicero’s De oratore of 55 bc:
read there was normally excluded from either (a) ‘higher’ prose (i.e. ‘colloquial’ ∼ ‘non-literary’) or
(b) an educated conversation (i.e. ‘colloquial’ ∼ ‘belonging to the sermo cottidianus’); it is risky to
assert (b) even for a ‘slip’ like the third person plural perfect sustinuere and accessere in Civ. 1.51.5 and
3.63.6 (cf. Rose´n 1999: 187–9).
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ac si<ut> cogitata praeclare eloqui possent, nonnulli studio et usu elaboraverunt,
cuius te paene principem copiae atque inventorem bene de nomine ac dignitate
populi Romani meritum esse existumare debemus: hunc facilem et cotidianum
novisse sermonem nunc pro relicto est habendum.
And even if not a few people have worked hard in theory and practice to ensure
that brilliant ideas can also be brilliantly expressed – and we must admit that you,
who are more or less the leading force and the inventor of this richness, have done
a great service to the name and dignity of the Roman people – to master this
straightforward everyday style must nowadays be regarded as a relic.
These words seem to react to De orat. 3.38 and 3.48, where Crassus
refuses to dwell on the ability of speaking Latine and plane:
neque enim conamur docere eum dicere, qui loqui nesciat; nec sperare, qui Latine
non possit, nunc ornate esse dicturum . . . praetereamus igitur praecepta Latine
loquendi, quae puerilis doctrina tradit et subtilior cognitio ac ratio litterarum alit
aut consuetudo sermonis cotidiani ac domestici, libri confirmant et lectio veterum
oratorum et poetarum.
For we do not try to make an orator out of someone who cannot speak; nor
to hope that someone who cannot speak good Latin, will now be able to make
elegant speeches . . . Let us therefore pass over the precepts of how to speak good
Latin, which are taught at elementary school, strengthened by the more advanced
systematic study of grammar or by regular exposure to everyday language at home,
and finally corroborated by books and the reading of old orators and poets.
What is here referred to as Latine dicere and taken for granted recalls the
unornamented ‘simple style’ characterised as sermo purus et Latinus in the
Orator (79) and already described with the same term as in the above
passages by the Rhetorica ad Herennium (4.14: id quod ad . . . cottidianum
sermonem demissum est). It thus appears that Caesar wants to complement
the De oratore, where Cicero failed to give adequate guidance because of
his elitist attitude: in De analogia we are supposed to learn more precisely
what Latine dicere means. Given this background, its dedication to Cicero
makes perfect sense, and since we know from a slightly later letter by Cicero
how keen he was at that time to learn about Caesar’s opinion on his literary
output (Cic. Q. fr. 2.16.5), we may also hypothesise, with Hendrickson
(1906: 110), that ‘Cicero himself would have forwarded a copy [of the De
oratore] to Caesar at his winter headquarters in Cisalpine Gaul’.
3 contents and background
If Caesar felt that knowledge of an unadorned facilis et cotidianus sermo –
the kind of sermo we do find in the commentarii – was something that
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could not simply be taken for granted but had to be taught, just as much
as Cicero’s ornatus, the question arises how he went about doing so in De
analogia. How did he determine what was, or was not, admissible in the
target style?
Most of the fragments are tantalisingly uninformative. Apart from the
one already quoted (which is preceded by the statement that Caesar also
held ‘that the selection of words is the basic principle of eloquence’, ver-
borum delectum originem esse eloquentiae), only one is of a general nature.
Unsurprisingly it is this one which was most often cited in antiquity. In
Gellius’ rendering it reads (fr. 2 = Gel. 1.10.4): tamquam scopulum sic fugias
inauditum atque insolens verbum ‘you should avoid like a rock in the sea
any word that is unheard of or unusual’. Nearly all the other fragments
concern specific minutiae of Latin usage and grammar, such as the correct
formation of various case forms3 (e.g. fr. 6: accusative plural fagos, not fagus;
8: accusative singular turbonem, not turbinem;4 9: genitive plural panium,
not panum; 10: genitive singular die, not diei; 11: nominative plural isdem,
not idem; 16: nominative-accusative singular lac, not lact; 22: nominative
singular pubis, not pubes/puber; 23: dative singular ornatu, not ornatui; 26b:
ablative singular iubare, not iubari, despite 25a, 25b and 26a on the ablative
in -i of neuters in -ar, -e, -al; 27: genitive plural partum, not partium), the
assignment of grammatical number (fr. 3: harena, not harenae) and gender
(fr. 18: masc. crinis; 19: ntr. pollen), word formation (fr. 28: mortus, not
mortuus; 29: ens as participle of esse), syntax (fr. 12: se vs sese)5 and ortho-
graphy (fr. 17: genitive singular Pompeiii, not Pompei).6 Thus, despite the
randomness of what is transmitted, it is clear that De analogia did not just
establish, or argue for, abstract rules, but entered into a discussion of a wide
range of concrete topics.
What is more difficult to say on the basis of these fragments alone is
whether Caesar’s main aim was to provide stylistic guidance in every major
3 Fr. 31 (= Gel. 6.9.13, on e-reduplicated perfects like memordi, pepugi, spepondi) may not belong to
De analogia (despite Klotz 1927a: 185); no other fragment deals with verbal conjugation, and Fronto
(p. 224.15–16 van den Hout) summarises the contents of De analogia as de nominibus declinandis,
de verborum aspirationibus et rationibus ‘about the declension of nouns, about the aspiration and
regularities of words’.
4 The fragment (Char. p. 183.19–24 Barwick) must be corrupt when it compares caro, caronis (sic), but
the usual correction to Cato, Catonis is doubtful in the light of phonemic restrictions on analogical
pairings (cf. fr. 13, Siebenborn 1976: 72–5); a better reading would be carbo, carbonis.
5 Doubting the authenticity of the fragment (Char. p. 142.4–7Barwick: sese in indirect reflexive usages),
Klotz (1910: 223–39) observes that Caesar uses sese for emphasis; however, the theory in De analogia
does not always fully agree with Caesar’s practice (cf. §8, Oldfather and Bloom 1927: 596–7).
6 Klotz (1927a: 185) further suggests that Caesar may have codified in De analogia the superlative
spelling -imus instead of -umus (cf. Quint. Inst. 1.7.21, Isid. Orig. 1.27.15). Similarly, the question of
initial /h-/ (cf. n. 3) was partly (though not exclusively: Catul. 84, Gel. 13.6.3 with Nigidius fr. 21
Funaioli) an orthographical one.
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area of uncertainty or whether the grammatical suggestions he made were
introduced as (probably selective) illustrations of some overarching prin-
ciples. A number of considerations suggest the latter. Firstly, the scopulum
rule (fr. 2) would be unhelpful to anyone wanting to know, say, what
the ‘pure’ dative singular of a u-stem noun like ornatus was: the problem
was precisely that neither ornatu nor ornatui were inaudita atque insolentia
verba (cf. Lomanto 1993: 667–70). Secondly, most but perhaps not all of
the issues mentioned in the fragments appear to have been real cases of
doubt – although we have to concede that we may never know for sure
whether a genitive plural partum or a participle ens sounded as outlandish
in Caesar’s time as our lack of relevant attestations suggests; after all, the
similarly awkward-looking nominative-accusative lact was used by Varro
(Men. 26, L. 5.104) and Pliny (Nat. 11.232, 22.116), and partum could be
found in Ennius (Ann. 593 V. = 600 Sk.). Thirdly, and most importantly,
the title De analogia itself points to something theoretically more advanced
than a ‘Primer of Good Latin’. It positions the treatise in the midst of
a fierce debate among Hellenistic and Roman grammarians, orators and
philosophers (cf. Dahlmann 1935: 265–71).
This is not the place to discuss in detail the controversies between the so-
called ‘analogists’ and their opponents, the ‘anomalists’ (cf. e.g. Siebenborn
1976: 97–109). In a nutshell, it may be said that the analogists stressed
the regularities in grammar, by pointing out paradigmatically predictable
patterns, whereas the anomalists highlighted any breech of such regular-
ity principles and thereby questioned whether language was governed by
anything other than mere convention; hence, some of their strongest evi-
dence came from word derivation (e.g. Var. L. 8.56: Parmensis ← Parma,
but Romanus ← Roma), synonymy (e.g. Var. L. 8.71: aedes Deum Consen-
tium, but regular genitive plural deorum) and homonymy (e.g. Var. L. 8.63:
dative = ablative in some nouns, but not in others). Moreover, given the
largely negative, empiricist and anti-theoretical thrust of their arguments,
the anomalists’ position had the advantage of simplicity and they could
weaken that of the analogists further by stressing the latter’s internal dis-
agreements. Thus, whereas the Alexandrian grammarian ‘Aristarchus, Varro
says, thought that analogical word forms should be used, to the extent that
common usage permits’, his Pergamene counterpart Crates of Mallus may
have been more fundamentalist, thinking ‘that analogical forms ought to
be substituted for forms in common use’.7 Such a divergence between
two analogical positions shows that we must clarify not only whether a
7 Blank (2005: 238), who shows that the older view, according to which Crates was an anomalist, is
based on a misreading of Varro’s De lingua Latina.
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particular figure was an analogist or an anomalist but also whether he
adopted one or the other viewpoint in a prescriptive or a descriptive man-
ner. For instance, from Varro’s text it appears that the Stoic Chrysippus,
who wrote three books  	

 in which he demonstrated similes
res dissimilibus verbis et dissimiles similibus esse vocabulis notatas ‘that similar
things were denoted by dissimilar words and dissimilar things by similar
words’ (Var. L. 9.1), was nevertheless in favour of analogically correcting
oblique forms on the basis of the nominative and vice versa (cf. Var. L.
10.59); in other words, he was descriptively an anomalist (accepting that
irregularities are real), but prescriptively an analogist (trying to do some-
thing about them).8 People like Aristarchus and Crates, meanwhile, were
analogists both descriptively (playing down irregularities) and prescrip-
tively (with Aristarchus apparently being more ready to make concessions
when analogy crassly contradicted common usage), whereas empiricists like
Sextus had to be descriptive as well as prescriptive anomalists (cf. Sextus
Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 1.191–3).
Returning to Caesar, his title De analogia clearly suggests an analogist
attitude of some sort, and many of the fragments point to a form of prescrip-
tive analogism grounded in the descriptive recognition of anomalism (e.g.
fr. 3 = Gel. 19.8.3 Gaius enim Caesar . . . in libris quos ad M. Ciceronem de
analogia conscripsit ‘harenas’ vitiose dici existimat, quod ‘harena’ numquam
multitudinis numero appellanda sit ‘for Gaius Caesar finds in the books
about analogy, which he dedicated to Cicero, that harenae is wrong, since
harena “sand” should never be used in the plural’).9 However, the case of
Aristarchus vs Crates (vs Chrysippus) shows that even within the world of
prescriptive analogism there were various positions, and we must therefore
still ask which one Caesar was taking.
4 caesar the populist or caesar the nationalist?
Whereas the grammatical fragments of De analogia have largely been
neglected in historical and literary scholarship, two articles published in
recent years have attempted to integrate this material into a larger pic-
ture of Caesar as a statesman. Although they come to widely divergent
conclusions, both of them assume that Caesar’s prescriptivism is of the
‘fundamentalist’ type.
8 On Chrysippus see further e.g. Steinthal 1890: 359–73 and M. Frede 1978: 71–3.
9 The plural harenae was widely used, not just in poetry (e.g. Verg. Aen. 1.107), but also in
cultivated spoken and written language (cf. the context in Gellius, Liv. 22.16.4, Suet. Aug. 80,
etc.).
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According to Sinclair (1994), Caesar had observed in his court-hearings
how the provincials in Gaul struggled to master a ‘Ciceronian’ elite language
based on Roman upper-class consuetudo. In order to win the support of
these groups, he decided to remove the barrier to their social advancement
by propagating a ‘democratic grammatical agenda’, in which ratio was
paramount and consuetudo at best played a role of arbitration when ratio
did not provide a satisfactory solution. Caesar’s ‘impulse’ to subject the
Latin language to systemisation would thus introduce the anti-libertarian
principles of political thought informing the later Principate.
In contrast to this, Hall (1998: 28) concludes that ‘imposing linguistic
order on the world against the intrusion of barbarisms, and imposing
political order on it against rebarbative tribesmen, are two sides of the
same intellectual coin’. Here Caesar is not making ‘democratic’ advances
to provincials, but promoting a ‘Latin ringfenced against contamination
by obvious rhetorical baggage or alien artistic ornament . . . , a deliberately
calculated expression of uncompromising Romanitas’. The creation of a
pure, analogist Latin, the Latin of the Bellum Gallicum, is primarily to be
seen as directed against foreign, especially Greek, influences: it is nationalist
rather than populist.
There are obvious weaknesses in both of these readings. For instance, one
might object to Hall that, while every attempt to set up linguistic norms has
something potentially ‘national’ about it, to construct an anti-Greek Caesar
is hardly more promising than to construct an anti-Greek Cicero. Having
spent several years in the East and having studied with Apollonius Molon
in Rhodes, Caesar himself used Greek freely in speech and writing,10 and
he greatly admired Greek culture (cf. e.g. Suet. Vit. Ter. 7 on Terence
as a dimidiatus Menander). The fact that De analogia (fr. 22) promoted
the Latin declension pattern for Greek words and names (e.g. accusative
Calypsonem, not Calypso) is just the unavoidable result of an analogist’s
mindset and need not have anything to do with nationalism.11 And as for
Sinclair’s views, we may wonder whether Caesar in 54 bc really needed the
support of some poorly educated provincials as much as that of the Roman
aristocracy and, more generally, if the publication of a style guide is the
most promising way to amass a political following.
In our context, however, the main shortcoming of these readings is
their unquestioned belief in Caesar’s linguistic fundamentalism and, in
10 Cf. Caes. Gall. 5.48.4, Cic. Q. fr. 2.16.5, Plutarch, Caesar 2 and 46, Pompey 60, Suet. Jul. 82.2; see
further Kaimio (1979: 130–1, 255–6), who even concludes from Plin. Nat. 1 Ind. xviii that Caesar
wrote his De astris in Greek.
11 For the discussions about this issue see further Var. L. 10.69–71, Quint. Inst. 1.5.58–64.
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connection with this, their disregard for the intellectual debate in which
De analogia takes part. To start with, Cicero himself states that Caesar
rationem adhibens consuetudinem vitiosam et corruptam pura et incorrupta
consuetudine emendat ‘by applying analogy corrects mistaken and corrupt
usage by pure and incorrupt usage’ (Brut. 261). In other words, Caesar’s
analogy does not operate freely, overruling usage in the name of a greater
good. According to Cicero, the result of a Caesarian correction is still in line
with one form of consuetudo, which would not (or not necessarily) be the
case if only ratio counted. Moreover, only such a mitigated form of analogy
is in line with the scopulum rule, and Poccetti (1993b: 621) is therefore
certainly right when he states that a closer inspection of the fragments
of De analogia reveals how Caesar did not blindly espouse the analogists’
cause, but rather positioned himself in the midst of the ‘complex cultural
kaleidoscope’ of a period which was strongly imbued with eclecticism. In
Poccetti’s view, the consuetudo-based scopulum rule acts as a final check
against an exaggerated application of analogical principles: first, ‘abstract’
analogy establishes that Y would be better than X, but if Y is an inauditum
atque insolens verbum, whereas X is not, Y must not be used out of respect
for consuetudo.12
However, this is not exactly what Cicero is saying (cf. Dihle 1957: 193–4;
Siebenborn 1976: 111–12). Cicero speaks of two forms of consuetudo, one
vitiosa, the other pura. Hence, both ‘good’ Y and ‘bad’ X are anchored in
consuetudo. What Caesar’s analogy does is merely help to decide which one
is ‘good’; whereas what is outside consuetudo to begin with need not be con-
sidered at all since the scopulum rule is applied at the start, not at the end,
of the selection process.13 Caesar’s analogism is thus as non-fundamentalist
as analogism could possibly be, and with its restriction to cases of variatio
within consuetudo, which foreshadows Varro’s reconciliatory position,14 it
would have been equally unsuited for a populist and for a nationalist
agenda. The uneducated provincial still had to know what options were
12 Cf. similarly Leeman 1963: 157; Dahlmann 1935: 262–4 remains somewhat contradictory.
13 In practice, De analogia may have overstepped these limits occasionally, for why should for instance
a participle ens be ‘correct’ when consuetudo apparently knew neither this nor any competing form
(fr. 29; cf. Collart 1954: 148 n. 3)? Note, however, that the matter certainly called for debate on a
theoretical level: contrast potest : potens = est : X → X = ens with abest : absens = est : X.
14 Cf. Var. L. 10.74 on the analogia quae derigitur ad usum loquendi (i.e. the individual’s analogy);
Siebenborn 1976: 96–7 and Mu¨ller 2001: 200 and 195, after Collart 1954: 149–57, on the primacy
of consuetudo in Varro (e.g. L. 9.2–3, 9.35, 9.114) and his differentiation of a consuetudo recta and
a consuetudo depravata/mala (L. 9.11, 9.18). Contrast the stricter attitude depicted in Var. L. 9.20
(verbum quod novum et ratione introductum quominus recipiamus vitare non debemus ‘we must not
shrink back from accepting a word which is new and established through analogy’) and enacted by
people like Sisenna (Cic. Brut. 259, Gel. 2.25.9; Rawson 1979: 343–5).
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available through consuetudo, and even the staunchest defender of Roman-
itas was given no means to prevent consuetudo from adopting ‘un-Roman’
elements.
5 ratio, natura, auctoritas
Now, if for Caesar analogy should operate only where different forms
of consuetudo compete, it might be asked whether that does not make
his analogism meaningless. After all, even an anomalist had to decide
in cases of doubt and might therefore have conceded that ratio could
usefully be applied here.15 However, ratio was not the only possible criterion
available. According to a Varronian fragment (fr. 268 Funaioli), [Latinitas]
constat . . . his quattuor: natura analogia consuetudine auctoritate ‘good Latin
rests on these four criteria: nature, analogy, usage, and authority’.16 The
relative weight given to each of these could vary, so that assigning the
first rank to consuetudo still left open the possibility of deciding between
competing forms of consuetudo with the help of either natura or auctoritas
rather than analogia (ratio). In order fully to understand the implications
of Caesar’s position, we must briefly look at these alternatives in turn.
Varro’s natura is a somewhat elusive concept (cf. Siebenborn 1976: 151–
4). In the fragment cited, he exemplifies it by arguing that the use of a form
scrimbo instead of scribo would simply be ‘unnatural’ (presumably because
no-one ever uses or used scrimbo, nor would anyone postulate scrimbo for
the sake of analogy), but the term also evokes the old discussion between
those who believed in a natural () connection between signifiants and
signifie´s and those who held that signifiantswere assigned to signifie´s through
an act of – potentially17 arbitrary and conventional – nomenclature ().
Thus, a proponent of the  view could have argued that a consuetudo
variant Y is better than its competitor X because Y is closer to the ‘inherent
nature’ of the concept denoted, as shown for instance through etymology.
There is one fragment of De analogia which leaves no doubt about what
Caesar thinks of such naturalist theories of language (fr. 4 = Gel. 19.8.7).
Having established that caelum ‘heaven’, triticum ‘wheat’ and harena ‘sand’
should not be used in the plural, he asks his addressee: num tu harum
rerum natura accidere arbitraris quod ‘unam terram’ et ‘plures terras’ et
15 Cf. the anti-analogist voice in Var. L. 8.26, where the acceptance of variation is then preferred.
16 Cf. Quint. Inst. 1.6.1 with a slightly different list; from Cic. Orat. 157 one might also add suavitas,
i.e. ‘euphony’ (Siebenborn 1976: 154–5).
17 Not all  proponents believed in a purely arbitrary relationship of signifiants and signifie´s: cf.
n. 19.
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‘urbem’ et ‘urbes’ et ‘imperium’ et ‘imperia’ dicamus, neque ‘quadrigas’ in
unam nominis figuram redigere neque ‘harenam’ multitudinis appellatione
convertere possimus?, ‘Do you think it is due to the nature of these things
that we can speak of one terra “earth” and several terrae, of one urbs “City”
and several urbes, of one imperium “supreme power” and several imperia,
but cannot turn the word quadrigae “horse-team” into the singular or the
word harena “sand” into the plural?’ The expected answer is ‘No’, and the
viewpoint we are invited to share is unmistakably conventionalist.18
Turning to auctoritas, Caesar could hardly have put a similarly dismis-
sive rhetorical question to his dedicatee. We remember Cicero’s words in
De orat. 3.48: praetereamus igitur praecepta Latine loquendi, quae . . . libri
confirmant et lectio veterum oratorum et poetarum (cf. above, §2). For some-
one like Cicero, who was even prepared to accept the occasional archaism
merely for the sake of ornatus (De orat. 3.39), auctoritas would have been
a more obvious choice than ratio in deciding between competing variants
(cf. Fo¨gen 2000: 136–8).
6 inventing epicurean grammar and style
To sum up the results reached so far, we have seen that (a) despite its title
the De analogia assigned first rank to consuetudo, not ratio, in the relative
weighting of possible criteria of Latinitas, and (b) the fact that ratio, not
auctoritas (or natura), was placed second is itself worth noting, especially
given the well-known traditionalist attitudes of large parts of the Roman
establishment. We are now in a position better to define the place of
Caesar’s treatise – and with it, of Caesar’s stylistic choices more generally –
on the intellectual map of the Roman first century bc.
What is most remarkable about (a) is its pragmatic, undogmatic,
approach to language: it implies an empirical analysis of current consuetudo
whilst recognising that consuetudo is not always uniform. Together with
the unconventional stance adopted in (b), this yields a combination that is
neither in line with Alexandrian grammar a` la Aristarchus (where the basic
procedures are theoretical rather than empirical) nor particularly close to
the linguistic thinking in the philosophical schools most interested in such
matters: Stoicism and (Neo-)Pythagoreanism. It is true that the descrip-
tively anomalist position of someone like Chrysippus (above, §3) has an
18 Cf. in this context also Morgan (1997) on Caes. apud Suet. Jul. 77 nihil esse rem publicam, appel-
lationem modo sine corpore ac specie ‘the res publica is nothing, just a name without substance and
form’.
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intrinsic affinity with a consuetudo-focused empiricism, but a true Stoic
would not have dismissed as absurd the idea that something in language
‘happens by nature’ (natura accidere); and similarly, a Pythagorean would
have firmly believed in a -governed relationship between signifiants
and signifie´s,19 while being less ready to compromise on the imposition of
analogy through respect for consuetudo.
Yet, there is one philosophical school with whose principles Caesar’s
unique combination of (a) and (b), and also his dismissal of natura as a
factor in the shaping of language, tallies well: Epicureanism. Admittedly,
Lucretius’ Epicurean ‘Bible’ De rerum natura, also published in 54 bc,
has little to say about language, except for a digression on its origin from
animal sounds (Lucr. 5.1028–90). In a sense, language has thus come about
 even for an Epicurean, but Lucretius makes it clear that his is not
a  origin which informs the actual relationship of signifiants and
signifie´s: instead, this relationship is governed purely by human utilitas, as
demonstrated by a passage from Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus (75–6), where
the author underlines the function of language as a tool for unambiguous,
concise communication among groups of people who have come to an
agreement about its use.20
Unsurprisingly this teaching fits in well with wider Epicurean theories
about the world. According to these, the cosmos is governed by natural
laws as a consequence of orderly atomic motion. However, because of
the existence of the clinamen or ‘swerve’, which can make atoms collide
unpredictably, there is no absolute determinism and mankind is able and
invited rationally to apply its free will within the framework defined by
the natural laws. Crucially, the fact that chance may sometimes shatter
a rational plan must never discourage such rational action, for the ideal
Epicurean will remain ‘reactively creative’ even in the face of adversity, his
highest aim always being utilitas for the community.
Now, what has been described under (a) and (b) above constitutes a sort
of parallel microcosmos. Consuetudo is the communal linguistic framework
over which the individual has as little say as over the laws of nature, and
it is subject to influences which make it unpredictable. However, within
the framework set by consuetudo there is room for individual choices, and
these must be governed by ratio because only ratio has the potential of
optimising the usefulness (utilitas) of language as a communicative tool. If
19 Technically, the Pythagoreans promoted the  view, but since they believed in a name-giver with
a superior insight into the nature of things, their position was ultimately similar to that of the Stoics
(cf. Collart 1954: 259–60, 262).
20 On these passages see now Atherton 2005; Verlinsky 2005; Reinhardt 2008.
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one disregards other functions of language, it is not useful, for instance, to
retain a dative ornatu next to another dative ornatui.
It is this strictly utilitarian view of language which explains why Epi-
cureanism traditionally had an uneasy relationship with the arts of rhetoric
and literature. This was particularly obvious in the case of the (deliber-
ately?) unpolished earliest philosophical treatises in Latin by Amafinius
and Rabirius,21 but even the Greek Philodemus, a friend of Caesar’s family,
who was interested in questions of literary style and perhaps more flexible
in such things than many Epicureans, maintained that form and content
should not be separated because style was primarily a means to an end.
Thus, for a person with Epicurean leanings it would have been difficult
to appreciate Cicero’s De oratore with its emphasis on ornatus. A text like
Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum, on the other hand, which claimed to be nothing
but an artless military report, would have been something of an ideal, even
when in reality there was much art behind the artlessness.
7 caesar and epicurean romanness
We are now beginning to see an intrinsic connection between Caesar’s
linguistic theories and his literary style. Any Roman Epicurean should not
only have aimed for a Caesarian style, devoid of ornatus while efficiently
communicating facts, but also adopted a Caesarian view on what consti-
tutes good Latin. For such an Epicurean, Latin, like any language, was
essentially a means of communication, and therefore the community of
its speakers – not their ancestors (auctoritas) or some abstract principle
(natura) – had to define what was, or was not, admissible (consuetudo); but
since any community may have its disagreements, a fair method of solving
these was also required, and for this purpose nothing could serve better
than ratio, the distinctive capacity of humankind.
So everything would fall into place if we could assume that Caesar’s
thinking about, and making use of, language was informed by Epicure-
anism. Fortunately, there are good reasons to do so, since Caesar’s Epicure-
anism has been firmly established by other scholars looking at literary and
historical rather than linguistic and stylistic evidence.22 The Epicurean’s
pragmatic approach to adversity and his ‘reactive creativity’ aiming at
utilitas for the community provides the structural backbone of Bellum
21 Cf. Cic. Ac. 1.5, Tusc. 1.6, 2.7, 4.6–7.
22 See especially Rambaud 1969 and Pizzani 1993, e.g. on fortuna in the commentaries, Caesar’s speech
in Sallust’s Catilina or the clementia Caesaris.
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Gallicum and Bellum civile alike. Whatever the political realities and pro-
pagandistic aims behind these texts (Rambaud 1966), their presentation is
informed by philosophical principles – and we now realise, undoubtedly
as Cicero did (Brut. 262),23 that they are also written in the utilitarian style
that naturally suited those principles.
To Cicero, however, a philosophy whose highest good was utilitas must
have seemed exceedingly primitive (cf. Pis. 70). Caesar, in turn, must
have been aware of this disdain, for De analogia, in an elegantly oblique
manner, set the issue straight. Its dedicatory sentence (quoted in §2 above)
presents Cicero as the inventor of a new Latin style, whereas Caesar himself
acts as the advocate of an almost forgotten one. In Rome, where the mos
maiorum was commonly acknowledged to be the most important social
guideline, the latter, ‘Caesarian’, role was inevitably to be valued more
highly. Moreover, the same sentence associates ‘tradition’ with the use of a
facilis sermo – a facere-related, pragmatic, sermo – whereas the innovation
focuses on thoughts (cogitata eloqui). Given the opposition facere vs cogitare,
an attentive reader could not fail to remember that Rome’s greatness was the
result of acting, not thinking. Hence, the Epicurean linguistic pragmatism
advocated by De analogia turns out to be the perfect embodiment of
traditional Roman values, and any dissenting school of thought, however
more sophisticated it may look, will only be the less ‘Roman’ for it.
8 conclusion
It is time to conclude. At the outset, we observed that Caesar may be
called both the most and the least colloquial of all Latin writers, since his
‘Style without Qualities’ excludes both what would have been heard only
in ordinary conversation (e.g. vulgarisms) and what would never have been
heard there (e.g. poeticisms). Among stylists, the latter restriction required
a more explicit formulation than the former – hence the scopulum rule.
In a wider sense, however, the scopulum rule could also be interpreted as
an injunction against vulgarisms and the like; after all, in the context of,
say, a general’s report to the Senate a vulgarism too would have been an
inauditum atque insolens verbum. If we believe Cicero when he suggests
that De analogia was principally giving guidance in cases of doubt, we will
probably best explain the occasional disregard for its precepts in Caesar’s
23 Leeman (1963: 175–7), Brugnoli (1993) and Lomanto (1994–5: 53–5) stress the half-heartedness of
Cicero’s praise.
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other writings along these lines.24 As long as no educated person wrote
mortus or partum in a formal text – however advisable their adoption
might seem to an analogist – Caesar himself could not admit them in
such a register because his readers would otherwise have ‘stumbled’ and
the communicative flow would have been disturbed.25 In a speech to his
army, however, things might have been different if the ‘unusual’ variants
were widespread enough in oral Latin to be unmarked.26 Thus, Caesar
apparently used the analogically regular, but otherwise less ‘grammatical’,
active form frustrabo instead of frustrabor in addressing his soldiers (Caes.
orat. fr. 9 Klotz).27
In a more speculative vein, we may finally ask what would have happened
if Caesar’s De analogia had made a more lasting impact. As it is, Cicero’s
De oratore won out, Cicero himself became the model of Latinitas, and
auctoritas – including, ironically, Caesar’s own auctoritas – got precedence
over Epicurean consuetudo cum ratione. However, at least in theory the
latter could have prevailed over standardisation, so that the gap between
spoken/colloquial and written/literary Latin would not have become as
wide as it did. Presumably, the Romance languages would still be what
they are now, but we might not think of them as something distinctly
different from Latin, for no ‘classical’ Latin would have come into being.
And given all this, it might even be that in hindsight Caesar would have
disapproved more of the ‘archaisms’ or ‘poeticisms’ allowed for ornandi
causa by his highly respected dedicatee, Cicero (De orat. 3.39), than of
the ‘colloquialisms’ and ‘vulgarisms’ used consciously or unconsciously by
his less respected imitators, including the author of the Bellum Africum
whose un-Caesarian style has been described so well by the dedicatee of
the present volume.28
24 For examples see Oldfather and Bloom 1927; Dahlmann (1935: 264) argues that Caesar’s ‘analogisti-
sche Theorie bezieht sich lediglich auf die Beredsamkeit’, but the style of the commentarii is clearly
informed by similar ideas.
25 On Caesar’s respect for generic conventions see Adams 2005b: 74–7, after Eden 1962: 78–94 and
Leeman 1963: 175–7.
26 Mortus is attested in Pompeii (CIL iv 3129; cf. also N–W iii.529); on partum see §3.
27 Already found in Pl. Bac. 548 and Pompon. com. 79, and frequent in later Latin (Flobert 1975: 294),
active frustro is likely to have been common in first-century spoken language. Similarly, u-stem
datives in -u were used by Caesar in speeches and in the Anticato (Gel. 4.16.8, with Caes. orat. fr.
2 and Anticato fr. 5 Klotz), though perhaps not in the commentarii (Oldfather and Bloom 1927:
594–5).
28 Adams 2005b.
the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511763267.014
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Oxford University Museum of Natural History, on 19 Dec 2017 at 13:10:35, subject to
